

PARTNERING CONSULTANTS INTERNATIONAL

After Action Review for Ground-based Midcourse Defense

May 19-23, 2003 @ Colorado Springs, Colorado
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Overview and Summary

More than three dozen leaders and members of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense team worked for a week in Colorado Springs in an After Action Review for the GMD program. The participants had two goals for the work session: identify lessons learned and best practices, and, strengthen the Partnership. GMD team members submitted over two hundred comments (lessons learned and best practices) beforehand for consideration during the AAR.

The participants divided into five functional working groups to answer the question: “How can the program improve in the area of *(five areas of analysis)* to ensure a higher level of success in current & future IDO and GMD block upgrades”. The breakout groups presented their analyses and recommendations to the entire group for consideration and implementation. Details are included below.

The participants utilized key principles of Partnering to guide their discussions: trust, respect, open and honest communications. Participants’ comments throughout the week and at the close of the work session indicated progress on the Partnering front as well as capturing lessons learned, best practices and plans for incorporating them.

Key Points from AAR

- Identify, quantify and communicate risk.
- Need cost control team early on and continuity into execution.
- Plan for success, e.g., transition from HNC to POA, continuity of life cycle project team and other key people, availability of trained personnel early up front.
- Strategic level programs require strategic level planning and support. Engage leadership early and regularly to provide direction and assess progress and the organization.
- When processes are altered or overtaxed, oversight should be increased.
- Fluor got off to a tough start, but the leadership team has changed and Fluor is meeting requirements.
- Work together: earn trust, move forward past issues.
- Need transparency among Tri-Chair organizations. Trust, communication.
- We have been a successful learning organization: flexible, adaptive, modifying our behavior as problems or opportunities arise.

Overall Analysis: Themes, Patterns, Underlying Issues, Overarching Concerns

1. Assess, quantify and communicate risks more effectively to all levels of leadership. Need cost control team early on and continuity into execution.
2. Information flow: get the right information to right people at right time.
3. The first couple of months in the field are incredibly critical to success. We stumbled badly in some key ways the first sixty days at Ft. Greely. We may have lapsed as a team after the rush of awarding the contract. Our intensity level

dropped post-award, perhaps because the award process was grueling, sometimes brutal, and often exhausting. The overall team probably was not well-positioned to run with the ball post-award.

4. “Right people doing the right thing in the right place at the right time”. The processes and procedures are sometimes the root cause of a problem and sometimes it’s the people involved.
5. Get personnel onsite early, maintain continuity for key positions and get early assistance onsite.
6. We should have “joined at the hip” better: joint accountability, joint responsibility, joint planning, joint decision-making (where appropriate). Our hand-offs in particular needed improvement, for example, as we transitioned from Huntsville to Alaska.
7. The expedited nature of the project and the continual change in the program takes a toll on people day to day and longer term, e.g., productivity, alertness, clarity of insight or judgment, physically, mentally, emotionally.
8. Contractor performance: long learning curve, difficulty in understanding what customer (government) wanted, lack of discussion pre/post-award, did we start with the best team.
9. The program overall is non-traditional. Our traditional, typical and historical processes and culture and ways of doing business that we know well and use without thinking ... don’t always fit our needs nor work to our advantage. For example, our relationship with Boeing is different for most of us, and, Boeing’s decisions directly impact our work.

Best Practices: Things We Did Right

- We’ve done a superb job managing change and still meeting construction schedules.
- When mission is given, we attack and execute. We don’t shy away from problems or tasks.
- We helped customer plan for future activities to lessen the impact of change.
- We had problems early on, but are working hard now and doing well in many respects for trying and succeeding in satisfying customer.
- Responsive organization at all levels. Adaptation: adapting to change. Team has been responsive to a rapidly changing program.
- Metrics information and status at working level.
- Tri-Party Partnering has been a success. Formal Partnering early and at strategic points has been important to help us adjust and work through the changes. This base of Partnering helped with the AAR this week.
- Change isn’t always good and sometimes we need to say no.
- We reached beyond our immediate resources to obtain expertise and help in certain areas, e.g., scheduler.
- Utilized lessons learned from ChemDemil: Involving technical folks early on in design and then transitioning them to field to provide early and knowledgeable help at site.
- This AAR itself as a “learning organization” exercise. LA & NY’s participation is a good investment in getting better as we go.

Leadership: Where Should Our Senior Leaders Have Focused? What Should Our Senior Leaders Have Done to Enable the Team to Do the Things the Team Needed to Do to Be Successful?

1. On a strategic project, the executives across organizations must build close working relationships early on: HQUSACE, GMD, Boeing. Redevelop those relationships as players change. Build trust, respect and communication at the top. Engage on the big issues, the critical ones.
2. When mission and schedule changed (Nov-Dec '01), COE should have held a strategic planning session: new mission statement, new vision, new plan. Refocus where we are headed.
3. Support & help. Help us see the big picture. Provide the assets to get the job done. Help us understand where we can get help. Connect us to the “gray beards” --- the seasoned veterans of similar programs who can advise early on, help and listen. Provide occasional tiger teams to help the existing team during peak times; help them catch a breath. Ensure the working level folks buy-into the decisions made at the leadership level. Provide the occasional “attaboy”, especially when times are tough.
4. Assess the strengths and weaknesses of the organizations to perform/execute the work.

AAR Analyses & Recommendations
Per Five Functional Breakout Groups

1. AAR Description: Command and Control including Organizational Responsibilities and Regional Interface Including National Interface/Policy.

**Note: The six digit numbers below refer to “lessons learned” submitted by GMD team members prior to the work session. These submissions were entered as comments in the USACE DrChecks software for use by other Department of Defense programs and personnel.*

1.1

1. **Issue: 258671, 259533, 260407, 266905 - Lack of information following established protocol among GMW/GMS/CEHNC/CEPOA. Formalize relationships between various working group meetings associated with the SDIPT this includes IPRs, facility management/working groups, and adhoc Tiger Teams. Must ensure new players are included in the relationships.**

2. Discussion: Information sharing is essential. Use phone or face to face to clarify issues (e-mail as a last resort for critical information). Partnering needs to continue. Focus the various meetings at the appropriate command/organizational level. As the program expands to additional locations and involves additional organizations it is imperative that existing issue resolution forums be used to ensure the appropriate representation is involved. IPRs will continue to focus on execution at each site. The SDIPT has been the primary forum for planning and integration but needs to be reenergized and focused on coordination and resolution of current and CE/IDO site development issues.
3. Recommendations and Generation of Corrective Preventative Action Recommendations CPARs: GMW/SDIPT need to drive integration and proper configuration of the various forums involving principal program execution and management offices. SDIPT/GMW takes lead in establishing sub-level meetings.
4. Course of Action: Within an updated SDIPT framework:
 - a. Continue monthly execution IPRs at FGA and EAS to update GMS with info to GMW.
 - b. Continue monthly Facilities Management Update GMW/CEHNC/Boeing.
 - c. Conduct monthly Executive Facilities Update (O-6), GMW-CEHNC-Boeing, to address design and future operations for CDRs with CEHNC/CEPOA/GMW/GMS/SMDC/Boeing.
 - d. IPR and VIP Briefing slides will be posted on JDOC for information purposes.
5. Action Items/Due Dates:

GMW, in coordination with SDIPT partners develop an updated SDIPT framework that implements this action, 16 June 03.

1.2

1. **Issue: 266884, 266320, 266887, 266905, 259769, 259529 Risk analysis and assessment not quantified**
2. Discussion: GMD risk management process not followed by USACE.
3. Recommendations and Generation of CPARs: When program variances are identified the GMD risk management process is followed by creating risk waterfall charts and recovery plans. Stop light charts should be updated and briefed weekly until the recovery actions have corrected the variance.
4. Course of Action:
 - a. GMD risk management process must be followed for USACE program support.
 - b. USACE will provide risk assessments to the periodically to the SDIPT for potential inclusion as GMD program risks and posting to the Ops Center command and control charts.
5. Action Items/Due Dates: When cost and schedule variances (& technical risks) occur the GMD risk management process is followed.

1.3

1. Issue: 265225, 266457, 254660, 258673, 259532, 259430, 266479, 264891 Hand-off and transition between design and construction needs improvement at both USACE and JPO

2. Discussion:

- a. The "One Corps" philosophy needs to be emphasized. Lines of communication need to be clear.
- b. Transition of authorities from JPO program office handling planning and design to the office handling construction needs to be clearly defined and publicized.
- c. Transfer of lead authority from design to construction had hiccups and a learning curve with reports, tracking mechanisms, checklists and execution. Contractual requirements need to be required/enforced per the contract documents. Trust was initially lost with reporting. Requirements for reporting now ask for schedule with proof.
- d. Contract Management Assistant Visit was scheduled a considerable time period after award when the processes with the contractor were established, limiting the value of the application of recommendations. Recommend a team with expertise in the unusual features of the acquisition be scheduled to visit before and shortly after award.
- e. CEHNC was structured to deal with program changes generated during the design process. After the hand-off of the construction contract, CEHNC expertise and knowledge was brought into the management of program changes through involvement in reviews of pertinent submittals and RFIs. Better communication and coordination is required between design agent and construction agent organizations on a job of this magnitude and complexity.

3. Recommendations and Generation of CPARs:

- a. Final coordination meeting needs to be held with design and construction agent before the design is passed off for execution. Lessons learned need to be passed on and discussed in detail. The existing MOA needs to be reviewed to clarify organizational responsibilities. Develop a formal transition plan with close customer and Prime Contractor involvement.
- b. Customer involvement is required to ensure a common understanding of requirements.
- c. Contract reporting requirements need to be enforced.

4. Course of Action:

- a. Clearly establish expectations in advance and then meet those expectations.
- b. Establish process and forums for briefing contract cost and schedule variance.

5. Action Items/Due Dates: CEHNC in coordination with construction districts establish transition expectations, and reporting processes to minimize transition difficulties.

1.4

1. **Issue: 258605, 259534, 259535, 259561, 263848, 263857, 266887 Command and Control do not line up with Program Management Organizational responsibilities.**
2. Discussion: POA organization created a dedicated MD team co-located with the customer at Ft Richardson to support the program. This team, whether through location or other pressing District needs, lacked sufficient POA oversight and resources that ultimately impacted the program. As an example, POA MD team in Alaska District did not get timely matrix support when needed, specifically in a dedicated contracting officer and a resident engineer at EAS during critical times in the program. The MD team relied upon pulling assets throughout USACE rather than USACE pushing assets to support. Key and essential personnel need to be defined and resourced. District command did not provide adequate oversight in a manner that solved some of the personnel and management problems. If POD had received clearly articulated responsibilities to support the POA MD team the response would have been more forthcoming.
3. Recommendations and Generation of Corrective Preventative Action Recommendations (CPARs):
 - a. Increase staff integration between the POA MD office and the Alaska District in order to use processes that are already in place and provide oversight for future program activities. Use responsive and effective Matrix support as required.
 - b. Key and essential personnel must be identified by name and position and filled at all times. Maintain Command visibility of these requirements.
 - c. District, Division, and HQUSACE leadership take a more active role in overseeing and supporting POA MDT. Look for ways of facilitating and pushing support/identifying support available rather than always depending upon requests for assistance – pulling for support (hard to see the forest through the trees).
4. Course of Action:
 - a. Identify key and essential personnel.
 - b. Keep these positions filled at all times until no longer required.
 - c. Continue implementation of staffing plan approved by Program Director in February 2003
5. Action Items/Due Dates:
 - a. POA MD work with GMS to identify key and essential personnel and departure dates. 16 June 2003
 - b. District leadership take a more active role in overseeing the POA MDT.

1.5

1. **Issue: 259531, 259559, 259561, 258600, 258603, 260353, 263847 Command and Control do not line up with Program Management Organizational responsibilities**
2. Discussion: Role of Pacific Ocean Division in management of NMD program with Alaska District left POD out of the loop. POD oversight responsibilities of POA NMD activities were not clearly articulated. POD has responsibility as a resource and technical (cost & quality) provider and would have plugged personnel shortages. Key and essential personnel need to be defined and resourced.
3. Recommendations and Generation of Corrective Preventative Action Recommendations CPARs:
 - a. Make sure there are clear roles and lines of support for personnel staffing and program management. MSC has essential role in providing key personnel and technical (cost and quality) assistance beyond the ability of the district. Personnel changes are inevitable and must be managed both short and long term.
 - b. Program management roles and responsibilities are between HQUSACE and Districts with info to MSCs. Over-communicate requirements for support to include MSCs as well as what support is available.
4. Course of Action: Follow guidance contained in 26 June 02 MOA between MDA JPO and USACE which supercedes guidance from April 2001.
5. Action Items/Due Dates: Follow guidance contained in 26 June 02 MOA between MDA JPO and USACE which supercedes guidance from April 2001. All organizations follow MOA.

1.6

1. **Issue: 259560, 264891 Role of CEHNC as design agent separate from Deputy Worldwide Program Manager.**
2. Discussion: Role of Deputy Worldwide Program Manager needs to be separated from design role of CEHNC. CEHNC role includes the following functions: Funding management, design, transition support – design to construction, information management, GMD situational awareness, prime interface SDIPT, change management, programmatic support. Coordination with GMD and constructing agency is essential. Design reviews elevating areas of disagreement where comments are not settled or receive fair shake in incorporation of design comments. Transition to construction an area for improvement: 1) checklist, 2) IPR to be chaired at executive level, 3) push packages to aid in transition. LA & NY participate - Ramp down from design and review elements of cost estimate.
3. Recommendations and Generation of Corrective Preventative Action Recommendations CPARs:
 - a. The transition from design to construction is critical. Designer of Record remains at HNC with B&V.

- b. Use a combination of assistance teams/IPR/PDT meeting to transition design to construction with PMs, Prime Contractor, and engineers working together to review and clarify designs as necessary. This includes evaluation of design and cost estimate, BCOE.
- 4. Course of Action: Read, understand and execute MOA between JPO and USACE and CEHNC and CEPOA. Hold PDT meetings as required.
- 5. Action Items/Due Dates: Read, understand and execute MOA between JPO and USACE and CEHNC and CEPOA. Hold PDT meetings as required. CEHNC set up meetings as required.

1.7

1. Issue: 259560 Role of USACE Deputy Worldwide Program Manager

- 2. Discussion: Role of DWWPM is in support of WWPM involving interface with JPO. When dealing with CEPOA there are occasions where the role as Chief of the design team and the DWWPM are confused.
- 3. Recommendations and Generation of Corrective Preventative Action Recommendations (CPAR): USACE Worldwide Program Manager issue memo clarifying the role.
- 4. Course of Action: HQUSACE issue memorandum to clarify Deputy Worldwide Program Manager role.
- 5. Action Items/Due Dates: HQUSACE issue memorandum to clarify Deputy Worldwide Program Manager's role, including role as Life Cycle Project Manager (and counterpart in GMW). 6 June 2003

1.8

1. Issue: 259531, 258604, Implementation of current MOA and associated responsibilities

- 2. Discussion: Not all members of the team are familiar with the MOA and the roles and responsibilities contained in it. Reading the MOA should be part of in-processing into the program.
- 3. Recommendations and Generation of CPARs: The MOA should be used by all team members. However, it should also be reviewed to determine if any updates are appropriate.
- 4. Course of Action: Follow guidance contained in 26 June 02 MOA between MDA JPO and USACE which supercedes guidance from April 2001 until MOA is updated.
- 5. Action Items/Due Dates:
 - a. GMS and HQUSACE re-issue MOA to their organizations. 16 Jun 03.
 - b. USACE takes the lead to review and update the current MOA as appropriate. End of July 2003.

1.9

1. Issue: 267777 Organizational efficiencies can be improved with collocation of organizations

2. Discussion: Staff elements with similar functions initially were located at separate locations. Now through TDY they are collocated 50-60% of the time. This extended close contact has enhanced their operational effectiveness. Under a cost reimbursement contract, government and contractor staff should be co-located to maximize the synergy to deal with similar management issues. Mutual benefits have been attained as follows: Communication and resolution of issues is much more real time with less delay by organizational boundaries. Schedule and cost control efforts are more effective. Reporting processes should maximize use of contractor's reports without transcription into new reports.
3. Recommendations and Generation of CPARs: The Customer, contractor and CE staffs should be co-located at the working level to enhance communication and cooperation, facilitate partnering, and to develop better working relationships across organizations. Use of TDY and virtual teaming is effective in meeting the requirements.
4. Course of Action: Continue to refine efficiencies as the program matures and enters the final phase. Continue to reevaluate and adjust the management organizations and staffing levels as efficiencies are realized through collocation.
5. Action Items/Due Dates: FAI Management/staffing review, July 2003

2. AAR Description: Project Management. AAR Members: HQUSACE, POD, POA, CEHNC, GMS, GMW, GMW

2.1

1. **Issue #1: Project Management – Budget and Cost Control – including Quality of Service Project Management Plan Cost Control Procedures. Improve cost management control process through planning, design, and construction.** 258138, 253216, 260403, 266322, 266323, 266324, 259548, 259549, 259550, 259552, 257650, 260355, 253225, 253120, 258138
2. Discussion: Different opinions of what constituted cost base line led to misunderstanding. Due to programming prior to development of scope, the project delivery team needs to be included in discussions.
3. Recommendations and Generation of CPARs:
 - a. Develop a Program cost reporting process and procedure, including cost assessment risks.
 - b. Establish a Cost Control Working Group to be identified in the Project Management Plan (PMP).
 - c. Establish a reporting documentation form.

4. Course of Action:
 - a. Improve interface among Customer, Design and Construction Agent for development of cost estimate.
 - b. Cost Control Working Group will identify and track cost risk drivers.
5. Action Items/Due Dates: Develop a charter for the Cost Control Working Group no later than June 12, 2003. Charter should include work for Vandenberg, Ft. Greely, and Ft. Drum. Charter must be included as an appendix to the IDO Project Management Plans. Cost Team Action Officer - POC: HNC & GMW

2.2

1. **Issue #2: Project Management - Organizational Planning. Improve the Organizational Planning Process to insure that the appropriate organization is in place, understood and agreed upon to execute the assigned mission.** 257395, 257400, 258597, 258598, 266332, 259528, 266900, 259551, 259558, 257103, 253219, 258562, 258565, 258598
2. Discussion: Significant effort was expended by POA to determine the best organization to support the program. Several briefings were conducted within USACE and with the customer to gain support without resolution. As a result, the final organizational structure was not approved until a year after contract award. The Project Management Plan (PMP) must identify appropriate actions that provide value added to the customer (reports and briefings, cost control, and project management). The PMP needs to clarify that the Project Delivery Teams (PDTs) for the GMD Program includes the Tri-chair representatives.
3. Recommendations and Generation of CPARs: USACE must develop (with customer input and support) a corporate start-up organization for strategic projects that appears homogenous to the customer, one door to the Corps – one button to push ... and secure approval prior in sufficient time to ramp up prior to construction.
4. Course of Action: The Project Management Plan developed in conjunction with the start-up organization, must identify roles, responsibilities and authorities of the organizations with execution authority.
5. Action Items/Due Dates:
 - a. The Lifecycle Project Manager, in conjunction with the customer and the executing MSC, will develop the appropriate organizational structure to efficiently manage the work no later than June 30, 2003 in conjunction with the yearly revision of the MOA. POC: CEHNC-MD.
 - b. Develop the supplemental PMPs for the IDO work at Vandenberg AFB,
6. Ft. Greely, and Ft. Drum no later than June 30, 2003. POC: CEHNC-MD.

2.3

1. **Issue# 3: - Project Management - Acquisition Strategy and Plan. The Acquisition Strategy was developed and executed well considering the conditions of the program. However, the total team was not engaged after initial contract award.** 253210, 266315, 264979, 265171, 265189, 259527, 257653, 258126, 253222, 253253, 253183
2. Discussion: The Acquisition Strategy was an excellent document, fully coordinated with all parties to include the Department of Defense. The strategy focused on the award process but not on the execution process after award. The Acquisition Strategy should have included measures of engaging the total team during the definitization process of the cut-in design modifications.
3. Recommendations and Generation of CPARs:
 - a. The Contracting Officer must be a member of the Project Delivery Team (PDT) responsible for sharing information with other team members. *Note: PDT should decide when and where and how to share relevant information with other stakeholders and when/where/how to involve other stakeholders in decisions.*
 - b. The construction agent must be fully involved in the PDT during all design phases, and the contractors involved in all design phases after award as a full PDT member, to implement the acquisition strategy during the construction phase. *(Have already begun implementing this with Fluor.)*
 - c. Continually assess applicability of execution plan, adjust as necessary for current conditions, and communicate current execution status to all PDT members.
4. Course of Action: Strengthen the PDT concept to include all stovepipes (& other stakeholders, where appropriate).
5. Action Items/Due Dates:
 - a. Develop a post award execution plan - develops as an appendix to the IDO Project Management Plan no later than June 30, 2003. POC: POA. *Note: Beginning immediately, POA will inform GMS of changes (FCPs, mods) and GMS will decide which ones they care to actively discuss and participate. For example, GMS would engage in the power plant definitization but not most small, day-to-day type changes.*
 - b. USACE & JPO will develop a plan to provide visibility and continual information concerning status of DDC and contingency funds, including usage and projections of needs. POC: HNC & GMW by June 30, 2003.

2.4

1. **Issue # 4: Project Management - Schedule Control. Schedules for all organizations, activities, and task levels were not fully identified, resulting in integration and cost control problems.** 254655
2. Discussion: Level of detail available to the site was insufficient to allow appropriate site integration. There was no single source combining information from all site users to allow de-confliction of ongoing actions. Program scheduling software used to develop various schedules was not compatible and different assumptions and milestones were being used. (There were approx 35 different schedules in use at Ft. Greely at one time.) . One Software Package was selected for use at Ft. Greely to solve integration problems.
3. Recommendations and Generation of CPARs:
 - a. Recommend this schedule integration process be expanded to other sites. (Integration Issue)
 - b. Before construction starts, the PDT will develop an initial schedule and cost for the first 100 days of construction. (Contract and Cost Management Issue)
4. Course of Action:
 - a. Continue integration process at other sites.
 - b. In all future solicitations, incorporate into the contract requirements for the contractor to meet with the other PDT members before any work starts and develop the integrated schedule and cost for the first 100 days. See “Contract Management Group’s” discussion.
5. Action Items/Due Dates:
 - a. Scheduling integration direction to be provided in draft form, to the Huntsville Center, Deputy Director of Missile Defense, no later than June 30, 2003. POC – GMW (SASWG).
 - b. Ensure this requirement is incorporated into all future solicitations prior to contract advertising. POC: CEHNC-MD. See “Contract Management Group’s” discussion.

2.5

1. **Issue # 5: Project Management - Communications Plan A communication plan has not been articulated and communicated between all stake- holders.** 260399
2. Discussion: Huge amounts of information are flowing to a vast number of teams and team members over a large number of communication networks and channels. There is no one centralized location for all available information and little discipline within the system to search for information in a centralized location before requesting information from others. The result is significant lost effort in regenerating information that is already available from various sources or searching all the information systems for the information.

3. Recommendations and Generation of CPARs:
 - a. Identify the communication toolbox in the communication plan portion of the PMP. *Note: Integrate MDA Public Affairs requirements and sensitivities.*
 - b. Verify the functionality of the communications toolbox to meet program requirements.
 - c. PDTs identify the proper information to be captured.
4. Course of Action: Review PMP to assure update of the communication plan.
5. Action Items/Due Dates: Review the PMP to comply with the recommendations not later than June 30, 2003. POC:

2.6

1. **Issue # 6: Project Management - Quality Assurance Control. The contract management team was not positioned for success at the time of award.** 259562
2. Discussion: Advanced S&A funds cannot be released until the project was authorized which occurred simultaneously with the contract award. Field Office was staffed with technical personnel from Ft. Richardson Staff Office during staff ramp-up. In addition there were no agreed to metrics in place at the time of contract award (how we will measure success in the project).
3. Recommendations and Generation of CPARs:
 - a. Explore possibilities for funding of Resident Office start-up prior to contract award.
 - b. Adopt metrics and measures prior to contract award.
4. Course of Action:
 - a. When USACE and GMD starts a new project, find funding to establish the resident office prior to contract award based upon an approved staffing plan and associated spend plan.
 - b. Establish a project metrics and measures team.
5. Action Items/Due Dates:
 - a. The HQUSACE World Wide Program Manager will determine a way to establish (\$\$\$) Resident Office prior to contract award. POC: HQUSACE
 - b. Metrics and Measures to be included in the Quality Assurance portion of the draft PMP no later than June 30, 2003. POC: CEHNC

3. AAR Description: Contract Management and Quality Assurance.

3.1

1. **Issue: Contract Management**-Comment #'s 258647, 259766, 260387, 263866, 263867, 265243, 267768, 267781, 253253
2. Discussion:
 - Change orders were not issued immediately to the contractor when the 100% IDT design was completed
 - USACE did not conduct systems reviews in a timely manner (e.g. DCAA audits)
 - Contract management procedures were not clearly identified early in the contract. Procedures were not formalized and documented
 - USACE did not negotiate office location, manning, etc. with the contractor post award.
 - Early relationship with the audit agency was weak, which complicated the timely execution of system reviews and is a contributing factor to potential defective pricing with subcontracts.
 - The use of technical direction v. contract modifications. USACE has used modifications when technical direction would have sufficed.
 - Should there be an ACO on-site?
 - The use of one subcontractor across the facility v. one contractor for one building. This project allowed for the use of one contractor per building; however, there are more advantages to using a single subcontractor for specific disciplines.
 - USACE and the contractor worked well with the local labor community.
 - USACE lacks organic property administration capabilities
3. Recommendations and Generation of CPARs:
 - USACE to conduct system reviews in conjunction with source selection when possible. When not possible, conduct as soon after award as possible.
 - After award of cost-plus contracts, USACE should negotiate with the contractor to establish contract management procedures and agreements to fix associated cost parameters
 - DCAA should be involved early in the PDT for cost-plus contracts.
 - Technical direction on the cost-plus contract is preferred and only use modifications for scope changes and fee impacts. Discuss procedures with the contractor and maintain a detailed record of technical direction to assist in cost control.
 - It is important to have an ACO on-site for fast track cost-plus projects.
 - Utilize single contractors for each trade to increase standardization, minimize administrative oversight, and maintain a high level of quality.
 - On future cost contracts, USACE should identify personnel with unique skills that are available for use by the PDT, e.g. property administrator.
4. Course of Action: Implement recommendations into future contracts

5. Action Items/Due Dates: N/A

3.2

1. **Issue: Acquisition Strategy** - Comment #'s 254694, 259545, 254696, 257109b, 258651, 263862, 263863, 263865, 263864, 265236, 266326, 266329, 266330
2. Discussion:
 - USACE had insufficient time prior to award to develop and conduct an effective source selection.
 - Offerors had insufficient time and information to prepare adequate proposals.
 - The requirements could have possibly been "split" to allow for some of the effort to start immediately, e.g. site work, while the designs were completed on other requirements. *Note: If we bundle requirements in IDO, should we split out pieces of work?*
 - The customer insisted that plans be designated as For Official Use Only, which restricted their distribution during the RFP phase. The alternate method selected (Material Take Off's) affected early execution, quality of proposal, cost, etc.
 - USACE did not conduct discussions with offerors, which contributed to early performance (USACE and contractor) issues.
 - RFP did not have sufficient detail of contract requirements (e.g. CDRL for EVMS).
 - Systems evaluations (e.g. purchasing system) were not part of the source selection criteria.
 - Reliance on oral presentations for technical approach was the result of a lack of time in the source selection process. These were not part of the proposal so they were not considered discussions.
 - USACE did not have the expertise on the team to do an effective cost realism analysis.
 - Small Business goals were ambitious, but it appears that the contractor will meet them. These goals have not affected competition.
 - Performance has indicated that the Government did have sufficient time to engage in discussions with offerors during the source selection process. This would have increased the Government's understanding of the proposals and performance risk.
 - The contractor did not conduct adequate planning during the early stages of the program, which was a direct result of the phased nature of the designs.
 - Having the RE as well as other execution personnel involved in source selection process was wise.
 - The acquisition strategy employed met the customer's expectations and their strategic needs.
 - The use of oral presentations for selection had many benefits, including swiftly orienting the selection team to the contractor's approach, the

opportunity to ask questions specifically related to the presentation (not discussions). However, the use of oral presentations needs to be integrated into the RFP Sections 100/120 (L&M) providing direction on proposal preparation/submission/oral presentation and selection criteria. Two of the selection criteria as stated in this RFP were inconsistent with oral presentations: NAS and EVMS, limiting the rating to a maximum of satisfactory.

3. Recommendations and Generation of CPARs:
 - USACE should insist on sufficient time to conduct a thorough cost plus acquisition process (solicitation development, proposal preparation, discussions). By doing this, the Government and the contractor both benefit as risks and expectations are better understood.
 - When unable to perform a thorough acquisition process, USACE must communicate *or over-communicate* the increased risks associated with the acquisition strategy employed. *Note: Probably did okay on this at certain levels for Alaska, except that the magnitude of cost escalation caught customer off-guard.*
 - When unable to perform a thorough acquisition process, USACE and the contractor must expend greater resources/energy immediately after the award to ensure that the requirements are understood, and that the contractor is in a position to be successful during early performance.
 - Reevaluate how we develop our risk assessment model. *Note: See also the Command & Control recommendation on risk assessment.*
 - When oral presentations are used verify the Sections 100/120 (L&M) are consistent and the evaluation criteria provides room for distinction between offerors (ie. Watch out for criteria that requires Technical Proposal submissions exceeding what is allowed, particularly in areas of Integrated Management Plans and Schedules, Risk Plans, and Earned Value Management Plans).
4. Course of Action: USACE senior leadership should work with their customer counterparts to ensure that risks are clearly communicated *or over-communicated* when high-risk acquisition strategies are employed. When major changes in the acquisition strategy occur, the USACE PMP should be adjusted accordingly.
5. Action Items/Due Dates: N/A

3.3

1. **Issue: Contract Management Staffing** - Comment #'s 258637, 258638, 258641, 259541, 259542, 263852, 267761
2. Discussion: USACE did not/does not have the best possible Contract Management personnel in-place to manage a cost plus contract
 - USACE did not have an adequate staff in-place at the time of award to effectively manage this cost plus effort
 - Not all USACE's contract management staff had/have the necessary cost plus skills/experience to be fully successful on a program as dynamic and challenging as this one.

- Having USACE contract management personnel co-located by function with contractor personnel on a fast track, cost plus contract creates significant efficiencies
 - USACE's "footprint" at the site should be a consideration. In other words, some functions can best be performed in a location other than the site.
 - USACE has not maximized its internal expertise with respect to some functional specialties to meet personnel requirements (e.g. estimating). This will continue to be important as the program matures and evolves.
3. Recommendations and Generation of CPARs:
 - USACE should have an adequate (#s, experience, skills, etc) contract management staff in-place prior to contract award on a program with this many challenges (contract type, national priority, location/environment, etc). This would better posture the program for success.
 - USACE should work with the successful offeror on a program as dynamic as this to develop complimentary staffing plans to address the appropriate staffing levels and skill mix, location of personnel, etc at the time of award. Additionally, USACE should team with the successful offeror to ensure that requirements and expectations are communicated and understood.
 - USACE needs to "front load" the training and communication of lessons learned on cost plus programs. An assistance team with representation from all required functional disciplines should visit the contract management staff and advise in the planning and development of contract management procedures, work instructions, etc. immediately after award.
 - USACE should revisit the use of term positions on a program as important as this to ensure that we are attracting and retaining the best possible work force.
 - USACE should revisit the grade structure and equity of incentives for program personnel.
 4. Course of Action: Lifecycle Project Manager and District Commander execute the above recommendations in coordination –as needed-- with higher command.
 5. Action Items/Due Dates: Lifecycle Project Manager and District Commander execute the above recommendations in coordination –as needed-- with higher command. HQUSACE, HNC, POD, POA as leaders and advocates

3.4

1. **Issue: Configuration Management Process** - Comment #'s 260405, 258667, 266484, 254663, 263674, 265248
2. Discussion: The project's configuration management process has evolved over time to include non-technical matters that require contract action, which was not the original intent. This has created more work at all levels and is not adding value.

3. Recommendations and Generation of CPARs: The original intent of the process should be reinstated via revision so that it addresses only technical matters.
4. Course of Action: Review and revise existing configuration management plan.
5. Action Items/Due Dates: Review and comment on the current plan and revise as necessary -- June 30th. GMW for policy and procedure statement, and, for CMP

3.5

1. **Issue: QA Staffing** - Comment #259563
2. Discussion:
 - There is a concern/perception that USACE's QA personnel on the project do not have the desired skills to be fully successful on cost-plus contract. Most USACE QA personnel's experience is limited to firm fixed price contracts where the focus is on technical requirements whereas a cost plus contract demands expertise beyond just technical requirements (efficient use of resources, logistics, etc). This issue applies to the contractor's QC personnel as well.
 - QA personnel on a cost-plus contract must have an enhanced skill set in order to ensure that construction meets not only the requirements, but is also performed in the most efficient/cost effective manner.
3. Recommendations and Generation of CPARs: USACE needs to leverage internal expertise/talent on cost plus contracts through training sessions to be conducted after award, but prior to construction. Training should be conducted in a "partnering" manner with contractor involvement. The project should be occasionally "pulsed" to evaluate the need for refresher training.
4. Course of Action: USACE needs to expand the pool of cost plus QA personnel by training existing personnel and recruitment to include contract hire personnel. Consideration should be given to revising and expanding current cost plus training courses.
5. Action Items/Due Dates: USACE GMD will work with HQ to initiate cost plus training at Fort Greely for project personnel. Due date -- June 30th. HQ & Greely

3.6

1. **Issue: Change Management (FCP) Process** - Comments #'s 263678, 258663, 263861, 263870, 264727, 258623, 259567
2. Discussion: The project's change management (FCP) process is not as efficient or effective as it should/could be.
 - The higher the level, the more efficient and effective the process is
 - The level 4 (FWG) is inefficient due to the large numbers of participants and lack of focus
 - FCP's submitted to the FWG are often poorly defined and require additional effort/refinement

- Where tri-party participants are co-located, the process works best
 - The construction contractor didn't understand the contract's change management process for many months after award
 - How an FCP is designated (design vs construction) is not clear
 - Plan not tailored to the contract type
 - Resistance to change has retarded "VE type" changes that could have reduced cost
 - FCP process ensures that impacts on the design and system are identified to all parties and that cost and schedule impacts are mitigated
 - Decisions based on ROMs vs proposed costs or detailed cost estimates
3. Recommendations and Generation of CPARs:
 - Any program specific change management process should be provided to offerors as part of the solicitation process
 - Participation at level 4 should be refined to improve efficiency -- Participation should be limited to "key" personnel
 - Project specific change management processes should be a focus in the post award conference, and be reinforced through training with all participants (including the construction contractor)
 - Consideration should be given to increasing the authority at level 3 to empower the tri-party personnel at the site
 - The # of levels should be revisited
 4. Course of Action: Architects of the CMP will recommend a path forward for revisions to CMP, including recommendations from the DART.
 5. Action Items/Due Dates: Architects of the CMP will recommend a path forward for revisions to CMP, including recommendations from the DART. By June 6th.

3.7

1. Issue: Award Fee

2. Discussion:
 - The use of maximum 15% fee for construction efforts exceeds industry norms. FAR limitation on MilCon construction is 10%.
 - At award the award fee plan was not well balanced. Early emphasis on schedule was detrimental to the other evaluation factors.
 - Award fee is entirely subjective. Increased objectivity increases contractors' confidence in the award fee plan.
3. Recommendations and Generation of CPARs:
 - Future contracts should include a contractor proposed award fee plan during the evaluation phase.
 - Award fee should include objective goals and a base fee.
 - Award fee plans for RDT&E construction should conform to industry norms.
4. Course of Action:

- USACE and customer are currently in the process of negotiating a change to the existing fee structure.
 - Future award fee plans should include the above recommendations.
5. Action Items/Due Dates: USACE and customer are currently in the process of negotiating a change to the existing fee structure. Future award fee plans should include the above recommendations 30 June 2003

3.8

1. **Issue: BCOE Review** - Comment #'s 258614, 264786
2. Discussion: The use of independent BCOE reviewer is a solid practice; however, the review should be focused on bid ability and constructability. Boeing conducts operability reviews (TSPR) and JPO conducts environmental reviews. The BCOE process works well, we just need to ensure the right parties are engaged and signed up.
3. Recommendations and Generation of CPARs: USACE should only contract with reviewers with experience related to the project (e.g. cold weather construction).
4. Course of Action: Design agency needs to coordinate with the construction agency to ensure that design reviewers have the requisite experience to perform an effective and meaningful BCOE review. Include designation of reviewing parties in PMP.
5. Action Items/Due Dates: N/A

4. AAR Description: Cost Estimating and Cost Control & Management.

4.1

1. **Issue: Cost Estimating Issues associated with Pre-Award Phase** 259564, 254714, 266473, 264845, 263670
 - Construction cost estimates, at all levels, was not always shared with all stakeholders to include customer, design agents, construction agent, and etc. In addition, site specific construction conditions were not adequately addressed. The processes for cost estimating, validating cost estimates, and preparing/approving of Independent Government Estimates (IGE) are not known.
 - Lack of proper resourcing in cost estimating and technical engineer support affected the validity of the construction cost estimates.
2. Discussion:
 - Cost estimates were inaccurate and unreliable in projecting construction costs because of changing and undefined scope.
 - A national priority program on a constrained schedule is perceived by the contractor community as having “deep pockets”. If backed into a corner, the program has little leverage due to timelines to make significant

procurement strategy changes. The current Alaskan construction climate is driving prices higher than anticipated.

- Phased approach made cost estimating difficult. In particular the areas of site utilities and site work in general.
 - Project Management and basically all activities were not clearly defined in WBS.
3. Recommendations:
- The roles, responsibilities and processes for cost estimating for 1391(s), CWE(s), IGE(s), contract award, cut-in designs and contract changes should be defined in a Program Management Plan or Project Management Plan.
 - Provide Project Management Plan and Program Management Plan to all stakeholders.
 - Periodic cost estimates should include all assumptions (efficiencies, site specific considerations, mobilization, schedule, physical working conditions, contract climate).
 - Dedicate Cost Construction Engineer at design agent site to validate adequacy of all local consideration in CWEs.
 - Dedicate Cost Construction Engineer at construction agent site to validate adequacy of all local consideration in CWEs.
 - Align IGE and WBS/Contract Line Items. Develop Work Breakdown Structure dictionary as part of the Request for Proposal to align proposal cost with IGE.
4. Course of Action:
- a. PDT must ensure cost estimating resources are planned and included in PMP.
 - b. PDT must ensure the construction agent reviews the cost estimate and the estimate is adjusted as needed.
 - c. Conduct “on board cost estimating” on expedited projects.
5. Action Items/Due Dates: N/A

4.2

1. **Issue: Cost Estimating Issues associated with Award and Post-Award Phases** 260365 dup w/ 265254, 254714, 263869, 259538, 259530
- Lack of discussions prevented the resolution of discrepancies between the IGE and contractor’s cost proposals.
 - Award of the contract at less than the most probable cost masked anticipated contract growth.
 - Cost estimation needs to directly relate to how construction is going to be accomplished in the field and evolve as additional information is gained.
 - Poor communication among stakeholders regarding cost estimates.
2. Discussion:
- The contract was awarded with only generic design information or material quantities and had limited detailed designs, therefore was a lot of

risk associated with the contractor's knowledge of the work and his corresponding strategy changes.

- The Independent Government Estimate that was used during source selection understated the costs. A mitigating factor was the incomplete designs; however, the IGE's inaccuracy was magnified by the fact that it was based on a self-performance execution strategy vice a subcontract execution strategy that the selected contractor proposed.
 - The USACE contract with Fluor is currently projecting a significant cost variance. There is a significant discrepancy between the USACE initial estimate and the cost at which Fluor is willing to do the work after CEPOA contract modifications. There should have been a better definition and understanding of the contract baseline.
 - Once the contract is awarded the government cost estimate and contractor's proposal should be evaluated to determine the most probable cost to include the conditions of the contract and factor in experience gained regarding the bid climate, contractor acquisition strategies, etc.
 - Cost Estimating and Cost Control and Management -POA did not have a dedicated Cost Engineer on the program for development or validation of IGEs for cut-in designs or changes in excess of \$100k. POA now has a contracted AE Cost Engineer on staff for preparation of in-house design cost estimates and review of HNC/B&V cost estimates. The district should perform an ITR and approve all estimates prepared by the BMD Support Office for modifications in excess of \$100k.
 - Regional Interface including National Interface/Policy -The program was schedule driven. Concerns about cost and undefined or incomplete scope were not properly addressed by USACE to the customer with associated risks. Incomplete or inadequate estimates did not substantiate concerns about cost. As HNC/B&V completed designs they were not supplemented by sound cost estimates at various stages of design. The potential for construction cost escalation was still not reflected in the cost estimates as the construction proceeded. Provide cost estimates at regular intervals in conjunction with design reviews.
3. Recommendations:
- Conducting discussions is critical to determine reasonableness of contractor's proposals and IGE shortfalls. Conduct and provide risk assessment prior to award and include possible areas of growth to all stakeholders. If discussions are not permitted on cost reimbursement contract, all stakeholders must understand that the award value may not be representative of true construction cost.
 - It is highly recommended that a post-award reconciliation be performed to align IGE to the contractor's methodology and Work Breakdown Structure prior to construction.
4. Course of Action: Establish a formal Cost Working Group including all stakeholders from project conception through construction completion. (GMW, HNC)

5. Action Items/Due Dates: Establish a formal Cost Working Group including all stakeholders from project conception through construction completion. (GMW, HNC); 12 June 2003

4.3

1. **Issue: Definitization** 258617, 258618, 258620, 258630, 259537, 259767, 263853, 259790
 - The lack of involvement amongst stakeholders during definitization process.
 - Lack of stakeholder buy-in of cost estimates.
 - Difference between IGE and the amount agreed to upon definitization.
 - Reconciliation was not performed prior to definitization.
 - Lack of reconciliation of material takeoffs in RFP with the 100% design package.
 - Difficulty in cost estimating due to phase work and WBS.
2. Discussion:
 - Why were cost estimates by Black and Veatch, CEHNC, and CEPOA significantly different and normally lower than costs agreed upon with FAI?
 - Why wasn't CEHNC fully involved in cost control and management during negotiations and contract definitization efforts?
 - Why didn't CEPOA or GMD Support Division have a qualified Cost Analyst on staff (or TDY from another USACE organization) from the time the Test Bed contract was transferred and especially during the change order negotiations?
 - Contract was awarded in April. 100% design was issued in 6 phases starting in April and completed in September. Supporting facilities (Site Improvements and Mechanical/Electrical Utilities) for Ft Greely was divided into 4 phases and it became difficult to determine which cost details belong to which phase.
 - The cost estimates for the phased cut-in designs were significantly lower than the contractor's proposals and negotiated costs. Some of the higher costs can be justified as "market-driven", where subcontracts were competed but the market was saturated. It is not clear whether Black & Veatch and USACE may have incorrectly underestimated the costs, or whether there may be defective contractor and subcontractor pricing data. The DCAA audits may discover defective pricing data.
 - Why were cost differentials between CEHNC Official Government Estimates and Contractor proposals not reconciled before executing Modifications P00014 (Definitization of Modification P00002, Phase 1 Design) and P00016 (Definitization of Modification P00004, Phase 2 Design)?
 - Clearing and Grubbing (C&G) cost overruns appeared as a surprise after the work had been completed. The C&G acreage increased with a final design cut-in issued after contract award. It is not clear why the B&V cost

estimate did not indicate a significant cost increase for increasing the C&G acreage. It is not clear why the scope of the design cut-in did not clearly identify the significant increase in C&G acreage. It is not clear why the Independent Government Estimate (IGE) did not identify a significant cost increase. It is not clear why POA personnel did not know that there was a significant C&G increase with the design cut-in. There appears to be a process breakdown here where the finalizing of a design after contract award did not properly address the scope and cost change of the cut-in design.

3. Recommendations:
 - Roles/responsibilities and processes must be developed for identifying/validating/ communicating scope/cost changes associated with cut-in designs after contract award.
 - Align IGE to the contractor's methodology, RFP material take-offs and WBS.
 - Recommend that the issue of underestimation of cut-in design costs be further analyzed after the DCAA audit findings are made available.
 - Avoid phased designs. If phased designs are necessary, then the design phases should align with construction chronology (sequencing) rather than by facility.
4. Course of Action: Establish a formal Cost Working Group including all stakeholders from project conception through construction completion.
5. Action Items/Due Dates: Establish a formal Cost Working Group including all stakeholders from project conception through construction completion. 25 June 2003

4.4

1. **Issue: Cost Control** 259565, 263859, 259540 Cost Management personnel was not ramped-up at contract award at project sites. Cost reimbursement experienced personnel are critical to controlling cost.
2. Discussion:
 - POA was not properly staffed at start of the contract to effectively perform cost control/cost mgt. POA was behind in ramping-up; the staff did not have extensive expertise in cost-plus contracts.
 - A clear process needed to be in place and executed in advance of contract award for cost control personnel.
 - Lacking the ability to have permanent cost control personnel on site in a timely manner, a mitigation plan must be in place to provide cost control support.
3. Recommendations:
 - Get organizational plan approved early. Recruitments for experienced personnel should start early enough to get proper personnel on board in a timely manner and training should be provided early enough for personnel who were going to manage the project.
 - The cost control support needs to be established a minimum of 30-days before contractor mobilization.

4. Course of Action: Future construction agent needs to develop and implement an organizational plan.
5. Action Items/Due Dates: TBD

4.5

1. **Issue: Cost Management** 254715, 259547, 266892, 259569, 263673, 263858, 264832, 264838, 266476
 - Lack of communication between stakeholders on cost management issues resulted in inadequate coordination and visibility in the decision making process and the commitment of funds.
 - Inadequate risk and uncertainty analysis and management by all stakeholders.
 - An initial cost management system was not in place at start of construction.
 - Lack of having initial setup time for developing Contract Management Procedures
 - Capture of lessons learned in cost data and integrating into future
2. Discussion:
 - CEPOA previously negotiated contract modifications that increased the contract value to a level that essentially committed the program reserve without adhering to program guidance on the procedures to get approval for use of program reserve. A ‘tiger team’ was commissioned to address the root causes of cost increase and to develop courses of action for the way ahead. Initial meetings were held 21-25 Oct 2002. Upon completion of the ‘tiger team’ meeting, the findings and recommendations, including a clear government estimate of cost, were to be briefed to senior program management in order to get approval for use of the reserve and to address the plan ahead for negotiating remaining contract modifications. This is especially challenging given the lack of program funds and the fact that we will be bumping against the \$500M congressional cap.
 - If additional work is added to the contract, the estimate for the additional work should be jointly developed and agreed to between stakeholders. Once the proposal is received the stakeholders should have visibility and agree to the proposal cost to allow for contingency funds to be programmed.
 - CEPOA must provide feedback to GMS/GMW and USACE Huntsville on trends it is seeing in cost issues so that these can be built into future estimates and programming.
 - EVMS is a powerful tool but the DOD compliant system is complicated and takes time to implement, and has best advantage when time period for work allows for getting system up and running.
3. Recommendations:
 - a. Establishment processes and procedures in cost management, especially in the area of commitment of funds. The existing policy for USACE to follow to get approval for use of reserve dollars must be reinforced with specific, supplemental guidance from GMW. Include a

continual analysis and updating of risk associated with continually maturing and changing designs.

- b. Plan for a minimum of 120 days for implementing cost management/EVMS system prior to construction work by controlling initial scope of work.
4. Course of Action: N/A
5. Action Items/Due Dates: N/A

5. AAR Description: Team Coordination, Communications, Problem Solving and Team Work. *AAR Members: CEHNC, GMW, GMS, CEPOA. (Joined later by CEERDC, CENWO and CESPL)*

5.1

1. **Issue: Priority 1 –Design/Construction Team Interface (including Us vs. Them): Tri-Party Team as well as individual organizations (JPO, USACE and Prime). 259427, 259430, 266617, 260223, 259543, 259544, 258673, 263677 and 259546.**
2. Discussion: Interfaces are challenging.
 - a. Design agent to construction agent.
 - b. Division of engineering during design responsibilities across organizations (design agent, construction agent, Prime for GMD, JPO execution reviews).
 - c. Program office interface (budget).
 - d. “Designers feel that their work was logically based on detailed discussion and coordination on the criteria with all the parties. The constructors believe that they know what is necessary to build facilities that will be operable and maintainable in Alaska.
3. Recommendations and Generation of CPARs (corrective and preventive action reviews). **(Team view on current progress of these items or lessons learned.)**
 - a. Tri-Party areas
 - 1) Planning and Design Working Group (P&D FWG) interface with Site Working Group (SFWG) (both ways)
 - a) Determine which FWG will oversee designs required by approved FCPs. **(In Progress to establish process)**
 - b) Determine early on the design agent and acquisition strategy for additional work (Block Upgrades/Phased Improvements). **(In Progress, relates to DART recommendations for Configuration Management Plan revisions/P&D FWG) See Contract Management working group’s recommendation**
 - c) Transition from Planning and Design Facility Working Group to Site Facility Working Group requires a

relationship with trust. Ongoing relationship requires open communication and willingness to rely on each other. For bridge building purposes, provide for management level execution representation during design. **(No actions possible without increased time and staffing levels)**

- 2) Partnering
 - a) Partnering plan established at the beginning addressing Tri-Party and individual internal partnerings. Make sure correct people/offices are at the partnering sessions. **(For future programs)**
 - b) Initial Tri-party partnering with arrangements for partnering maintenance (follow through on action items and schedule follow-up meetings) **(Success story-complete)**
- 3) DARTs- Agenda for break-out sessions should include future design and construction interface. **(As appropriate/GMW, Boeing and USACE)**
- 4) Emphasis on Division 1 preparation requires participation by PDT to identify all joint occupancy, user, host installation requirements, etc. **(Future acquisition packages/GMW, Boeing and USACE)**

b. USACE areas

- 1) Project Management/PDT (Project Delivery Teams)
 - a) HQ establish a recommended practice for Project Management compliance with PMBP on programs and projects crossing district lines (different design and construction agent).
 - b) Project Management needs should be tailored to the project.
 - c) Determining the make-up of the PDT is a challenge in complicated programs or when BRAC is involved. Much thought should be given to who should be included on PDT. **(In progress for existing PMPs)**
- 2) Internal partnering- identify organizational interface areas (including contractors) that would be enhanced by partnering and make this part of the PMP.
- 3) Assign a design lead (office) on FCPs requiring designs regardless of FWG assignment. **(Recently implemented)**

c. JPO areas

- 1) Internal partnering- identify organizational interface areas (including contractors) that would be enhanced by partnering. **(As appropriate/SAC Commander)**
- 2) Participate in assignment of a FWG to oversee design effort required for approved FCPs. **(In progress/SAC Site Manager)**

- 3) JPO Briefings to Program Director/Deputy Program Directors that include Tri-Party commitments requires prior coordination with partners. **(As appropriate/SAC Commander)**
- d. Boeing areas
 - 1) Internal partnering- identify organizational interface areas (including contractors) that would be enhanced by partnering. **(As appropriate)**
 - 2) Participate in assignment of a FWG to oversee design effort required for approved FCPs. **(In progress)**
 - 3) Improve the system architecture change process. **(As appropriate)**
 - 4) Definition and communication of Boeing structure during execution. **(As appropriate)**
4. Course of Action (lessons learned):
5. Action Items/Due Dates/Action Office:
 - a. USACE establish/communicate an approach for Project Management compliance with PMBP on the GMD program and projects crossing district lines (different design and construction agent, special cases like ESS). **(30 Jun 03/CEHNC & Districts)**
 - b. Project Management Plans (PMPs) should be revised per the guidance on projects crossing district boundaries. **(15 Jul 03)**
 - c. JPO establish/communicate the mission/organization interface between SAC World-Wide and SAC Alaska on the GMD program (different design and construction JPO Commands). **(30 Jun 03/COL Davis and COL Norgaard)**
 - d. SAC Alaska establish/communicate the Command delegation of authority and responsibility to the site manager. **(30 Jun 03/COL Norgaard)**
 - e. SAC World-Wide establish/communicate the Command delegation of authority and responsibility to the site managers at locations outside Alaska. **(30 Jun 03/COL Davis)**
 - f. Boeing look at the Recommendations and Generation of CPARs, para 5.d. and take action as appropriate. **(As appropriate)**

5.2

1. **Issue: Priority 2 Briefing/Reporting Synchronization (relates to site visits by higher headquarters)** 263832, 263676, 266620, 263872 and 259770
2. Discussion: JPO requirements for construction agent participation in Weekly Reports, Monthly Program Briefings (IPRs), and Presentations to select site visitors (Program Director and Deputy Program Director alternate monthly visits; occasional congressional delegation visits) tie up resources to update information with minimal value added.
 - a. Tri-Party (JPO, USACE and Boeing) team communications at all levels were impacted by a lack of mutual understanding of

terminology and concepts regarding cost reimbursable contracts, Earned Value Management System, and phased funding. This affected the effort to perform work.

- b. JPO expectations for weekly reports were not detailed until several months into construction, and mutual agreement with the construction agent was not reached for another several months.
 - c. JPO and the construction agent initially identified metrics for construction agent to evaluate and present monthly. However, it took several months to establish the effort involved in gathering the metric data, and the value added of the various metrics.
 - d. Although the process established early in the execution phase was to conduct briefings at the Site Activation Command (JPO) Headquarters Office, it became compelling to give a site briefing to select program officials and visiting dignitaries.
 - e. Standardized program information packages for site visitors were anticipated to be updated infrequently and would contain minimal status information. Program status briefings were intended to be given at the SAC HQ. Originally, SAC would brief the program status with info from reports regularly provided by the other Tri-Party members. In reality, the briefings were conducted at the site and each Tri-Party member prepared their portion of the briefing at the site (resident office). The briefings grew to include assessments of status, trends, risks, and the opportunity to increase visibility, or vie for support or help, and the data harvested from reports. Tailoring the briefings to the audience resulted in format changes that became labor intensive.
 - f. A Communication Plan for construction was not covered in the Project Management Plan. Although a commo plan is required, a comprehensive commo plan is not feasible due to the complex organizational structure, continued evolution of the program and resource limitations.
3. Recommendations and Generation of CPARs (corrective and preventive action reviews).
- a. Standardize the reporting form and the briefing form to be as similar as possible so weekly reports can be used as the basis for preparing a status portion of briefing. Utilize Power Point for selected routine reports for rapid transition to briefings. Utilize visual displays (bar charts, pie charts, graphs) as much as possible to present metrics, progress etc.
 - b. Synchronize the monthly IPR briefing to coincide with schedule updates and cost reports (schedule updates are twice monthly, and EVM Cost Performance Reports are updated once a month for POA Test Bed construction). Don't mess with the contract status reporting cycle.
 - c. Utilize the monthly IPR briefing as that week's report.

- d. Maintain a standard briefing format that is used for all visitors.
Don't prepare a new briefing (different) for each visitor.
- 4. Course of Action: GMS/POA/Boeing stay the course on the final agreements reached for briefing and reporting processes for FAI construction. **(As appropriate/All)**
- 5. Action Items/Due Dates/Action Office:
 - a. GMS/HNC/Boeing agreement on ESS installation reporting/metrics. **(15 Jun 03)**
 - b. Suggest GMW, USACE and Boeing review these recommendations for sites transitioning from design to execution phase. **(15 Jun 03)**

	Name	Organization	Title	Tel No.	Participant?
	CEPOA				
1		CEPOA-BM	Program Mgt. Asst	(907) 384-7224	M/T/W
2		CEPOA-BM			yes
3		CEPOA-BM	RE, Ft. Greely	(907) 384-7100	yes
4		CEPOA-BM	Division Chief	(907) 384-7684	yes
5		CEPOA-BM	Program Manager	(907) 384-7166	yes
6		CEPOA-BM	RE, Eareckson		yes
7		CEPOA-BM	Contracting Officer	(907) 384-7002	yes
8		CEPOA-BM	EVMS Team Lead		yes
9		Alumnus	Ex-Contracting Officer		Tuesday
10		CEPOA-BM	DETS Supervisor	(907) 384-7108	yes
1		Facilitator	Facilitator	(601) 544-3072	yes
	CEHNC				
1		CEHNC-MD	Mech Tech Lead	(256) 895-1660	yes
2		CEHNC-MD	IDT PM	(256) 895-1778	W/R/F
3		CEHNC-MD	Arch Tech Lead	(256) 895-1675	M/T/W/R
4		CEHNC-MD	SETA Support	(256) 895-1640	yes
5		CEHNC-MD	PM Team Lead	(256) 895-1313	yes
6		CEHNC-MD	Administrative Officer	(256) 895-1375	yes
7		CEHNC-MD	Contracting Officer	(256) 895-1151	yes
8		CEHNC-MD	Deputy WWNMD	(256) 895-1544	yes
9		CEHNC-MD	FGA PP/VAFB PM	(907) 895-1702	yes
10		CEHNC-MD	Estimating	(256) 895-1857	yes
11		CEHNC-MD	ESS PM	(256) 895-1732	T/W/R/F
12		CEHNC-MD	Business Team Lead	(256) 895-1527	yes
13		CEHNC-MD	Division Chief - ED	(256) 895-1802	Tuesday
14		CEHNC-MD	FGA RR/IDO PM	(256) 895-1443	yes
	CEPOD				
1		CEPOD		(808) 438-8424	yes
2		CEPOD-MM-M		(808) 438-6927	yes
3				(808) 438-9737	yes
	CRREL				
1				(603) 646-4445	W/R/F
	HQUSACE				
1		CEMP-MD		(202) 761-0641	yes
2		CECW-ZW		(202) 761-0106	no
3		CEMP-MD		(202) 761-8633	no
4		CECW-ET		(202) 761-7507	yes
5		CEMP-M	MP, Chief	(202) 761-8656	yes
6		CEMP-MD		(202) 761-8636	no
	GMS				
1		GMS-T	Site Manager, Ft Greely	(907) 873-3888	yes
2			Chief, Ops & Integration	(907) 384-7635	yes

3		GMS-T	Chief, Tech Mgt.	(907) 384-7332	yes	
	GMW					
1				(256) 313-9523	yes	
2		GMW	Director, SAC World Wide	(256) 313-9654	Monday	
3		GMW-P			yes	
4		GMW		(256) 885-7767	yes	
5		GMW	Deputy Dir SAC World Wide	(256) 313-9676	W/R/F	
6		GMW			Monday	
7		GMW-P	Chief of Planning and Programming Support	(907) 384-7635	yes	
8		GMW-P		(256) 313-9425	M/T	
	CENAD					
1		CENAN-PP-E		(315) 772-4106	no	
2		CENAN-PP-E	Resident Engineer - Ft. Drum	(315) 772-4103	T/W/R/F	
	OMAHA					
1		CENWO-PM-M	Project Manager	(402) 221-3894	T/W/R/F	
	CESPD					
1		CESPL-CO-HD	Project Manager	(661) 265-7222	W/R	
2		CESPL-CO-HD	Branch Chief - Contracting	((213) 452-3230	Wednesday	
	BOEING					
1				(703) 872-4021	Tuesday	